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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY HAMILTON BORUP, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs
- Case No. 14387 
MARJORIE CHANDLER BORUP, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTSf BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The plaintiff above named, the appellant herein, 
filed an action for divorce against the defendant and 
respondent herein. Trial was had before the Honorable 
CALVIN GOULD and judgment rendered therein. All references 
herein to the record of the case will be designated as (R); 
all references to the transcript will be designated as (T). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted defendant-respondent a divorce, 
approved the Stipulation of the parties in all respects 
except as to an unstipulated matter pertaining to support 
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money for the minor children of the parties and as to this 
matter made the following order in the Decree: 
3. Plaintiff is ordered and required to pay to the defendant 
child support and alimony as follows: $600.00 per month 
until June 1, 1976; $500.0.0 until September 1, 1976 with 
$100.00 of said amount to be alimony; thereafter child 
support in the sum of $85.00 per month per child until 
the youngest child's 21st birthday;provided the child is 
enrolled in college, trade or business school within 5-
months of high school graduation- or is physically unable 
to provide his or her own support" (R.z7; (Emphasis ours). 
It is to be noted that the provision of the Decree 
relating to support money does not conform with the decision 
announced from the bench as shown by the Memorandum Decision 
of the Court (R.20) which reads as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child 
until the respective child's 21st birthday,who is either: 
(a) Enrolled in college or trade or business school 
beyond high school within 4 months from high 
school graduation; or 
(b) Physically unable to provide his or her own 
support. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Decree reviewed, 
reversed or modified only in respect to the part requir-
ing the appellant to pay support money under any circum-
stances until the minor children are 21 years of age. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts insofar as they are pertinent to this 
appeal show that the parties hereto were married in May 
1953. As issue of the marriage 7 children were born to the 
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parties, who at the time of the divorce were MARK, age 19 
years; MELVIN, age 17 years; JERRY, age 16 years; KELLIE 
JEAN, age 14 years; PHILLIP, age 10 years, CARL, age 9 years; 
and LANCE, age 4 years. (R.l). 
During the marriage the parties accumulated cer-
tain properties and debts that were divided among them by 
Stipulation in open court. (T.36, 38, 39, 40, 41) (R.24, 25, 
27, 28). 
The Court took under advisement the unresolved 
issue as to whether support money should be paid for the 
minor children of the parties until age 18 or whether the 
Court had the authority to extend the time to age 21. The 
Court by Memorandum Decision (R.20) rendered judgment in 
this respect as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child 
until the respective child's 21st birthday, who is either: 
(a) Enrolled in college or trade or business school 
beyond high school within 4 months from high 
school graduation; or 
(b) Physically unable to provide his or her own 
support. 
The Decree drawn by respondent's counsel did 
not conform to the above and provided as follows in respect 
to support money: 
3.*******thereafter child support in the sum of $85.00 
per month per child until the youngest child's 21st birth-
day; provided the child is enrolled
 xin college, trade 
or business school within 4 months of high school grad-
uation or is physically unable to provide his or her own 
support. (R.27) (Emphasis ours). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO CONTINUE 
TO PAY SUPPORT MONEY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES UNTIL THE 21st 
BIRTHDAY OF EACH CHILD. 
Although the Decree in paragraph 3 (R.27) states 
that the child support was to be in the sum of $85.00 per 
month until the youngest child was 21 years of age,(Emphasis 
ours) this was in clear contravention of the Memorandum 
Decision of the Court (R.20) that provided: 
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child 
until the respective child1s 21st birthday, who is either: 
(a) Enrolled in college or trade or business school 
beyond high school within 4 months from high 
school graduation, or 
(b) Physically unable to provide his or her own 
support. 
If the wording of the Decree were to be upheld, 
it would mean that the support money for each child would 
continue until the youngest child (LANCE, who is now 4 years 
of age) was 21 years old. This could mean that when LANCE 
is 21, 17 years hence, that MARK would be 36; MELVIN, 34; 
JERRY, 33; KELLIE JEAN, 31; PHILLIP, 27; and CARL, 26 and 
that during all of this time that the appellant would be 
required to pay $85.00 a month for each of said children. 
For that reason alone the Decree in regard to the 
support money payment should not be allowed to stand. 
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The Court did not so intend, as is shown by 
the Memorandum Decision of the Court (R.20),and the law 
does not so provide. Section 15-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
enacted in the last regular session of the legislature pro-
vides: 
The period of minority extends in males and females to 
the age 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority 
by marriage. It is further provided that courts in 
divorce actions may order support to age 21. 
The above-cited statute provides that under 
no conceivable circumstances could support be ordered 
beyond age 21. 
Although the wording of the Decree does not 
conform to the intent of the Court shown by the Memorandum 
Decision (R.20), if the intent of the Court was: 
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child 
until the respective child's 21st birthday, who is either: 
(a) Enrolled in college or trade or business school 
beyond high school within 4 months from high 
school graduation, or 
(b) Physically unable to provide his or her own 
support; 
the case should still be reversed in regard to the objection-
able provision and the case remanded for modification of the 
Decree. 
This is apparently the first time the Supreme Court 
of our state has been called upon to interpret the above-
quoted statute (15-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, as amended). This 
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statute, apparently, is the legislature's product in the 
aftermath of STANTON vs. STANTON (43 L. ED.,2d 688) in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that Utah's former 
statute making the age of majority of a female 18 years and 
of a male 21 years to be violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was an appeal of 
the Utah State Supreme Court of STANTON vs. STANTON,30, Utah 
2d, 315, 517 Pacific 2d, 1010) (1974). 
Although the STANTON case in Utah Supreme Court 
and the United States Supreme Court dealt with various re-
lated matters, the main thrust of the case was that there 
was a denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution if the father's obligation to 
support a daughter terminated at age 18, but continued until 
age 21 for a son. 
It is the contention of the appellant that there 
is discrimination present in the case at hand, although not 
on the basis of sex. The decision of the Court requiring 
him to continue to support his children after age 18 is still 
discriminatory and violative of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Constitution. Under the provisions of 15-2-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended the appellant because he 
divorced the minor children's mother can be required to con-
tinue to support the children until they are 21. However, 
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if the appellant had continued to be married to the children's 
mother, no matter what the relationship, under no circumstances 
could he be compelled to support the children beyond age 18, 
they having reached the age of majority, but by the terms of 
15-2-1, it is provided that courts in divorce actions may 
order support to age 21. 
Where is the equal protection of the laws if at 
the time of a divorce or even thereafter a divorced father 
can be compelled to support his children until they are 
21 years of age, but the father who remains married regard-
less of the relations between father and mother need only 
support his children until they are 18 and under no pro-
» 
vision of the law can he be compelled to continue support 
thereafter? Obviously, the father who is divorced is dis-
criminated against and does not have the equal protection 
of the law as guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. 
The Court in its initial observation of the matter 
concluded he was without authority to make an award of sup-
port money that continued beyond age 18 (T.37): 
THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt counsel. I don't believe 
that a judge having a divorce case prior to 
the time the children reach the age of 18 can 
make that determination. I think that is a 
'••••*> discretionary determination that has to be 
made at that point. 
We submit that even though the statute is dis-
criminatory and violative of the Equal Protection Clause 
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of the Constitution of the United States, that if such a 
determination were to be made at all,it should be when 
the child has reached age 18 and a need for the continuation 
of the support money is shown at a proper hearing or if there 
is evidence before the Court that the child is because of 
physical or mental defects unable to provide for himself 
between the ages of 18 and 21 and there were no other re-
sources available to said child. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record 
whatsoever to substantiate the contingencies provided for 
by the Court in the Memorandum Decision or the Decree in 
regard to education or physical disabilities. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended provides the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
in these matters as follows (only the portion of the statute 
deemed as pertinent is quoted): 
*******The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect 
to the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and maintenance 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reason-
able and necessary*******. 
If it is deemed that support money for minor child-
ren should continue beyond the age of 18 years, this matter 
should be left to the future determination by the court un-
der its continuing jurisdiction upon a proper hearing at the 
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proper time when the said minors have reached the age of 
18 years. See McLEAN vs. McLEAN, 523, Pacific 2d, 862, 
RIDGE vs RIDGE, 542, Pacific 2d, 189. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY, ESQUIRE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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